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Competitive behavior is commonly defined as the decision to maximize one’s payoffs
relative to others. We argue instead that competitive drive derives from a desire for
social status. We make use of a multi-player auction task in which subjects knowingly
incur financial losses for the sake of winning auctions. First, we show that overbidding is
increased when the task includes members of a rival out-group, suggesting that social
identity is an important mediator of competitiveness. In addition, we show that the
extent that individuals are willing to incur losses is related to affective responses to
social comparisons but not to monetary outcomes. Second, we show that basal levels
of testosterone predict overbidding, and that this effect of testosterone is mediated
by affective responses to social comparisons. Based on these findings, we argue that
competitive behavior should be conceptualized in terms of social motivations as opposed
to just relative monetary payoffs.
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PYRRHIC VICTORIES: TESTOSTERONE MEDIATES COSTLY
COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR
Two conflicting conceptualizations of competitive drive exist in
the social science literature. First, in economics, competition
is commonly defined as the desire to maximize one’s payoffs
relative to others (Messick and McClintock, 1968). This for-
mulation underlies the social value orientation (SVO) measure
of competitive drive that is broadly used to assay competitive-
ness (Murphy et al., 2011). However, this definition of com-
petitive drive does not account for the fact that competition
often leads to outcomes with negative absolute and relative pay-
offs. For example, when competing for items in auctions, people
often bid far more than their estimated utility of the good (Ku
and Malhotra, 2005). Consequently, winning the competition
incurs net monetary losses while opponents’ revenue remain
unchanged.
The second conceptualization of competition considers it to
be the dominant means for determining status within a hierar-
chy for both humans and animals (Sapolsky, 2004). Although
social status is clearly associated with the ability to obtain power
and resources (Lin, 1999), several studies have also suggested
that individuals often consider status an end in itself (Barkow,
1989; Frank, 1993; Huberman et al., 2004). This is in line
with classic research in economics linking the drive for sta-
tus with the costly consumption of positional goods (Frank,
1993; Veblen, 2000). Evidence such as this leads to a view of
competitive drive as motivation to obtain social outcomes inde-
pendent of other considerations. Thus, behavior in competitive
environments may not only be based on expected monetary
outcomes but also on the utility ascribed to being the winner
or loser.
The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that an intrin-
sic need for social status is an important driver of competitive
behavior in economic decision-making, and, as a result, monetary
losses can occur as long as there are offsetting social gains. To test
this, we assess competitive drive using a common value auction
paradigm in which the motivation to win (and avoid losing) can
be measured on a continuous monetary scale. Specifically, the
optimal bidding strategy in this paradigm is well-known (Kagel
and Levin, 2009) and can be easily instructed to auction partici-
pants (van den Bos et al., 2008). One of themain advantages of the
auction task is therefore that the degree to which (equilibrium)
bids exceed the optimum serves as a direct quantitative measure
of individual differences in the effect of competition across par-
ticipants (McClure and van den Bos, 2011; van den Bos et al.,
2013). In essence, we measure the effect of competition as the
amount of money that participants are willing to lose in order
to win auctions.
We report two studies that use two distinct approaches to
relate competitive drive to social status. First, we manipulated
social context in order to increase the salience of social status.
Specifically, a large body of work (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010) has
shown that the incorporation of identity in economic models can
explain behavior that at first appears (economically) detrimen-
tal. This work suggests that people have identity-based payoffs
derived from their own and other people’s actions. For example,
men may gain utility from actions that confirm their manhood,
but disutility from actions that threaten this identity. Similarly,
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 189 | 1
van den Bos et al. Pyrrhic victories
people may derive utility from actions that impact their perceived
status, particularly when social status is highly salient (Immorlica
et al., 2012).
Our identities are complex and fluid. As a result, differ-
ent social contexts emphasize different aspects of our identity.
Research from social psychology has shown that minimal group
paradigms alter the salience of social comparisons (Brewer and
Weber, 1994). The heightened relevance of social comparison
may increase the desirability of being perceived as a high-status
individual (Ridgeway, 2002; Garcia et al., 2005) and in turn
impact social preferences over outcomes (i.e., increased utility
for winning and/or increased disutility for losing). In the first
experiment we investigated the effect of increased salience of
social status by taking advantage of a naturally occurring rivalry
between two universities. We contrast bidding when (1) partici-
pants believed that out-group members were present in the auc-
tion against (2) when participants perform the task in the absence
of explicit group identities. We hypothesized that the emphasis
on the participants’ identity, particularly given the existing com-
petitive relationship targeted by our manipulation (Schloss et al.,
2011), would increase the utility gained from obtaining status and
hence increase overbidding (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Finally,
we explored the role of affective response to social outcomes in
relation to the formal analyses of individual differences in social
utility.
Our second study takes advantage of the fact that differ-
ences in basal testosterone levels predict the drive for social
status, both across individuals and within individuals across time
(Mazur and Booth, 1998; Mehta et al., 2008; Eisenegger et al.,
2011). Additional evidence indicates that people with high basal
testosterone levels experience pleasure or dysphoria when they
succeed or fail to achieve higher status, whereas low testosterone
individuals show no such affective responses to status changes
(Josephs et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 2008).
We hypothesized that basal hormone levels would influence affec-
tive responses to status changes inherent in our auction task, and
hence would be associated with increased overbidding. We test
this prediction in a second experiment.
Overall, we argue that competitive drive arises from a desire
to obtain or maintain social status, giving rise to behaviors that
may have negative financial consequences.We conclude that com-
petitiveness is strongly driven by emotions arising from social
comparison and that economic theory ought to incorporatemoti-
vations related to social context and status.
EXPERIMENT 1: STANFORD vs. BERKELEY
METHOD
Participants
We recruited 47 male participants from a paid participant pool
maintained by the Stanford University Psychology Department.
The control group consisted of 21 participants (mean age= 25.59
years, SD = 10.90) after excluding 6 who did not believe the
cover story. The experimental group was composed of 19 sub-
jects (M = 21.15 years, SD = 4.36); one participant was excluded
because of prior experience in a sealed bid auction experiment.
The study was approved by the Stanford University Institutional
Review Board and all participants gave written, informed consent
before completing the task.
Sealed bid common value auction
In order to test predictions of the model on competitive behav-
ior, participants played multiple rounds of a 5 player sealed bid
auction task. At the start of the experiment, each group of 5
participants received a 15min tutorial on the auction task using
a standardized PowerPoint presentation (see van den Bos et al.,
2008, 2013 for details). During the tutorial the following points
were explained: (1) the structure of a first price sealed bid com-
mon value auction, (2) how to place bids using the computer
interface, and (3) the exchange rate between monetary units
(MUs) in the game and pay-off in real dollars at the end of the
experiment. To ensure comprehension of the task, all participants
completed a questionnaire that tested task comprehension before
continuing on to the experiment.
In each auction round of the auction task, participants were
given independent estimates of the value of an item under auction
(xi, where i indexes individual participants), and were provided
with the error term (ε) for that round. Subjects knew from
the tutorial that estimates were drawn from a uniform distri-
bution with maximum error ε around the true, but unknown,
common value (x0) of the item under auction. During the tuto-
rial, the difference between a normal and a uniform distribu-
tion was explained, and it was emphasized that any estimate
(xi greater or less than, but within ε of x0) was equally likely.
The error term ε was the same for all participants in each
round, but changed between rounds (ε ∼ {4, 5, 6}). The true
value, x0, was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with
lower and upper bounds of xL = 10 MUs and xU = 75 MUs. As
described in van den Bos et al. (2008) we used a different dis-
tribution when selecting true values (x0 ∈ [xL + εmax to xH −
2εmax]) to ensure that the optimal bid could be calculated by
xi − ε (see Methods below). In sum, participants were informed
that the true value (x0) was picked from the uniform distribu-
tion ([xL, xH]), and that they would only be given an estimate
(xi) of this true value and the error (ε) in order to determine
how to bid.
After all players submitted their bid based on this informa-
tion, the highest bid was determined and the winner’s picture
was shown to all players (see Figure 1 for a detailed timeline and
example stimuli). Only the winner gained information about the
true value of the object and the revenue made in that round.
Revenue was determined by x0 − bmax and was negative when the
winning bid (bmax) was larger than true value x0.
The experiment consisted of seventy consecutive sealed bid
auctions. For both the control and experimental groups, a cover
story was used to make the participants believe they were play-
ing against other human opponents, while in reality the other
players were simulated by a computer algorithm (cf. van den
Bos et al., 2008). For every round of the task, computer bids for
four simulated participants were derived from predefined bid-
ding strategies that were based on the result of a pilot study
(N = 35, see Figure A1) in which participants did play with
real other players. After completing the last auction, partici-
pants were debriefed and asked about their belief regarding the
multi-player nature of the experiment. Participants who did not
fully believe that they were bidding against other people were
excluded from data analysis. The experiment took about 45min
to complete.
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FIGURE 1 | Common value auction experiment design. Each round a new
object (flower) was presented with an personal estimation of the value and
error term indicating howmuch their estimation may differ from the real value.
After all bids were submitted, the outcome was shown at a variable delay of
4–8 s. Finally, a 6 s display showed either the winner of the auction, or the
amount of revenue gained or lost if the participant was the winner herself. This
is an example of the Stanford vs. Berkeley version. In the real experiment we
have used real names and pictures of the other players and the participant.
Experimental manipulation
Before participating in the study, participants were sent multiple
emails emphasizing the importance of arriving on time because
of the multi-player nature of the experiment. On the day of the
experiment, a picture was taken of the participants to be used
during the auction task. In the experimental condition, the par-
ticipants were instructed that this experiment was part of a larger
study in collaboration with UC Berkeley. This was explained in
neutral terms, to minimize differences from the control condi-
tion. The only substantial difference across conditions was that,
in the experimental condition, each player was represented with
her own picture and the logo of the university she was attending
(see Figure 1).
Behavioral analyses
Based on the signal (xi) and the error (ε), the (optimal) risk-
neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy can be deter-
mined for each round and each participant. The solution is
given by:
RNNE = xi − ε + Y, (1)
Where
Y = 2ε
n + 1exp
( n
2ε
[xi − (xL + ε)]
)
, (2)
n is the number of bidders, and i indexes participants (Kagel and
Levin, 2009). Following our previous study (van den Bos et al.,
2008), we selected values of x0 so that the term Y from Equation 2
is almost zero and can thus be safely ignored. As a result the
RNNE strategy is reduced to the equation:
RNNE = xi − ε, (3)
We analyzed behavior using a term that expresses bids relative to
this optimal strategy. Over/under-bidding relative to the error ε is
summarized by the bid factor, κ:
κ = bi − (xi − ε)
ε
, (4)
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were bi is the bid the participant submitted based on signal xi. A
bid factor of 1 implies that a participant’s bid, bi, is equal to her
signal xi, whereas a bid factor of 0 approximates RNNE.
Reinforcement-learning model
Following our prior work (McClure and van den Bos, 2011; van
den Bos et al., 2013), a reinforcement learning model was used
to summarize and interpret bidding during the task. The model
assumes that subjective value depends on both monetary rev-
enue (i.e., x0 − bi for the winning bidder and 0 for others) as
well-separate utility parameters associated winning (ρwin) and
not winning (ρloss) an auction. Thus, after winning an auction,
value was assumed to equal the monetary revenue plus the util-
ity of winning, ρwin. By contrast, after losing, value is determined
solely by the magnitude of (individually determined) disutility of
not-winning ρloss:
Ui =
{
x0 − bi + ρwin if bi = max(b)
−ρloss otherwise (5)
For the reinforcement learning model we assumed that, at the end
of every round, a prediction error (δi) was calculated based on the
difference between the actual outcome (Ui) and the outcome (Vi)
expected by bidding a given bid factor (κi):
δ(κ) = U(κ) − V(κ) (6)
For simplicity, we omit the subscript i that indexes participants in
Equation 6 for the remainder of the paper. This prediction error
was used to update the estimated value associated with differ-
ent bidding strategies (V(κ)). Note that through learning V(κ)
will converge to the expected value of bidding a certain bid fac-
tor, includes both the monetary payoffs as well as the utility of
winning and losing, ρwin and ρloss. Because κ is a finely dis-
cretized variable, the number of states over which it is necessary
to learn state-action values is very large. For modeling purposes,
we restricted predicted behavior to the approximate range of
bid factors submitted by participants in the experiment: −1 to
2, discretized in steps of 0.01. Furthermore, we assumed that
participants inferred that (1) when winning, larger bids would
have also won, although with less net monetary utility, and (2)
when losing, smaller bids would have also lost. This assumption
allowed us to update a range of value estimates, for values of κ
greater than or less than that submitted, on each round of the
auction (McClure and van den Bos, 2011; van den Bos et al.,
2013).
Learning based on reward prediction errors is modeled as
in most RL methods, with a learning rate (α) determining the
influence of δ on new values of V(κ′):
V(κ′) ← V(κ′) + ακ′δ(κ′) (7)
In the current model we scaled learning rate so that updating
only occurs within a limited range of the bid factor employed
on any trial in order to account for the fact that the probability
of winning with a given bid factor changes over time. This was
implemented by creating an effective learning rate that decreases
inversely with distance from κ:
ακ′ = α
1 + κ′ − κ (8)
Decisions were then generated by the model using a soft-max
decision function, with a parameter m that modifies the likeli-
hood of selecting bids:
P(κ) = exp (mV(κ))∑
κ′ exp (mV(κ
′))
(9)
The value function, V, was initialized to zero for all values of
κ. The denominator sums over all possible values of κ (indexed
by κ′ ∈ [−1, 2] as discussed above). We also experimented with
randomized initial values of V(κ), which is commonly used in
RL algorithms to encourage initial exploration of strategies, how-
ever, randomizing initial values did not affect the performance
of the model in any notable way (McClure and van den Bos,
2011). All model-related results are reported for fits conducted
with V initialized to zero. Note that previous model comparisons
have indicated that the ρwin and ρloss parameters are crucial for
the model to asymptote at a bid factor κ > 0. A standard learn-
ing model without ρwin and ρloss will necessarily result in an
asymptote of κ = 0 (see van den Bos et al., 2013).
We estimated the parameters (ρwin, ρloss, α, and m) of the RL
model using a simplex optimization algorithm in Matlab. The
model simulated the performance of five bidders with average
bid factors calculated for each round of 70 consecutive auc-
tions in 10000 runs of the model. A similar round-by-round
average bid factor was also calculated for the bids submitted by
the participants in the study. Best-fitting model parameters were
determined at the group level so as to minimize the sum-squared
error between averagemodel performance and the average subject
performance. Group-based estimates of α and m were subse-
quently used in a second model fitting procedure that was aimed
at estimating the individual differences in ρwin and ρloss for the
participants in the Experiment 1.
Sequential analyses and social utility
For behavioral analyses we defined two dependent variables to
investigate the relationship betweenmodel parameters and choice
behavior: [κ | win] and [κ | not win]. These two measures of
sequential changes in bid factor (κ) were computed by calculating
the average change in κ(κ(t + 1) − κ(t) following either winning
or not winning a round in the auction. To test whether the indi-
vidually estimated parameters for ρwin and ρloss predict different
aspects of participants’ behavior, both estimates were simulta-
neously regressed against [κ | win] and [κ | not win] using
multiple regression.
Affective responses questionnaire
After the experiment, participants were asked to report their
affective responses to different social and monetary aspects of
auction outcomes (e.g., “Realizing that another player wins a
lot of auctions made me feel . . .,” “ Losing money made me
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feel . . . ”; see Table A1). All items were answered using a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from “very negative” to “very positive.”
Factor analyses yielded two factors: a monetary and a social factor
(Cronbach’s α = 0.71 and 0.76, respectively; for more informa-
tion see Figure A1 and (van den Bos et al., 2013). The non-
weightedmean scores on themonetary and social items were used
as predictors for individual differences in competitive behavior.
RESULTS
The goal of this experiment was to test whether the competi-
tiveness of the social environment influences overbidding. We
therefore performed a repeated measures ANOVA with time
(grouped into bins of 10 consecutive rounds of actions) as a
within-participant factor and context (experimental vs. control)
as a between-participant factor for the average bid factor (κ)
across participants. As expected, there was a main effect of time,
indicating that participants learned to bid closer to the optimum
as the experiment progressed [F(9, 30) = 18.08, p < 0.001, see
Figure 2A]. There was also a significant main effect of experiment
condition, with participants in the Stanford/Berkeley context bid-
ding with a significantly higher bid factor than those in the
control condition [t(38) = 1.85, p < 0.03, one-tailed]. There was
no interaction between time and social context, indicating that
both groups learned to improve their bids at comparable rates
[F(9, 30) = 1.81, p = 0.12].
Based on visual inspection of the data (Figure 2A) we per-
formed post-hoc tests of the last for blocks of the task in order
to test whether differences in bidding were present at the end of
the task across conditions. These analyses revealed that there was
no longer a main effect of time, indicating that participants bid-
ding strategy was stabilizing [F(3, 30) = 1.12, p = 0.3]. However,
there was a significant main effect of condition [F(3, 30) = 2.94,
p < 0.03], with participants in the Stanford/Berkeley context bid-
ding with a significantly higher bid factor than those in the
control condition.
One limitation of the above analysis is its insensitivity to
idiosyncratic differences in bidding and win/loss history of each
participant. Moreover, grouping auctions into bins of 10 rounds
may obscure differences in how social context influences the way
that participants respond to winning and losing against different
competitors. To overcome these problems, we fit a reinforcement
learning model to the subjects’ round-to-round behavioral data.
FIGURE 2 | (A) Development of the bidfactor over time and (B) parameter
estimates of the utility of winning and losing. ∗p < 0.05.
This produced estimates of the value of winning and losing,
independent of monetary outcomes, for each participant. We
refer to the utility of winning and losing as ρwin and ρloss,
respectively. Since ρwin and ρloss are assumed to influence the
subjective value of different auction outcomes, the parameters
should correlate with how people adjust their bidding round-
to-round, independent of monetary outcomes. We tested for
this relationship by regressing ρwin and ρloss against changes
in bidding (κ) following a win or non-win, respectively. A
multiple robust regression, with Huber weighting function, of
both ρwin and ρloss on [κ | win] fitted significantly [r = 0.45,
F(2, 40) = 4.47, p < 0.02], but only ρwin [β = 0.69, t(40) = 3.84,
p < 0.001] and not ρloss[β = −0.13, t(40) = −0.62, p = 0.54]
contributed significantly to the regression. In contrast, in the
regression against [κ | non-win] [r = 0.46, F(2, 40) = 4.74,
p < 0.02], ρloss contributed significantly [β = 0.30,
t(40) = 2.75, p < 0.02], but not ρwin[β = −0.16, t(40) = −0.63,
p = 0.48].
Both of the social utility parameters, ρwin and ρloss, were signif-
icantly greater than zero in both experimental groups (p < 0.01
for all one-sample t-tests; see Figure 2B). The fact that social
factors influence bidding replicates our previous findings (van
den Bos et al., 2008, 2013). Our primary interest here was in
determining whether emphasizing the social identity in the auc-
tion increases ρwin and ρloss. To this end, we found that ρwin
was significantly greater in when in the Stanford/Berkeley con-
dition relative to control [t(38) = 1.9, p < 0.03, one tailed see
Figure 2B]. Additionally, ρloss showed a trend for being larger
in the presence of Berkley students [t(38) = 1.42, p = 0.08, one
tailed].
Our design also allowed for the further exploration of within-
subject effects in the Stanford/Berkley auction. In particular
we were interested in whether the presence of Berkeley stu-
dents had a general effect on overbidding, as the results above
suggests, or whether overbidding was dependent on the num-
ber of Berkeley players present in the auction. We found no
evidence of a relationship between bidding and the number
of Berkley players in the auction (r = 0.01, p = 0.9). Taken
together, these results support the hypothesis that a more
status-salient context may lead to a general increase in over-
bidding because of its effect on magnifying the social utility
attributed to outcomes, particularly the social utility of being the
winner.
The above analyses show that ρwin and ρloss had dissocia-
ble effects on competitive bidding strategies in the auction task
that varied by social context. To further explored the nature of
ρwin and ρloss, we correlated individually determined parame-
ter estimates with self-reported measures of affective responses
to auction outcomes in both groups. The results of these analy-
ses showed that individual differences in both ρwin and ρloss are
directly related to feelings associated with the social impact of
winning or losing an auction (Spearman’s ρ = 0.47, p < 0.003
and Spearman’s ρ = −0.36, p < 0.03, respectively). By contrast,
ρwin and ρloss were not related to preferences over monetary gains
and losses (Spearman’s ρ = −0.16, p = 0.32 and Spearman’s
ρ = −0.22, p = 0.18, respectively). Post hoc comparison of cor-
relation coefficients also revealed that the absolute correlations
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of ρwin and ρloss with the social factor were significantly larger
than with the money factor (z = 2.88, p < 0.001 and z = 3.11,
p < 0.001, respectively).
Taken together, these results indicate that bidding in common
value auction is sensitive to social context such that overbidding
increases when the social utility and affective responses attributed
to outcomes is elevated.
EXPERIMENT 2: TESTOSTERONE AND CORTISOL
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-six white, right-handed, male participants were recruited
for the study (mean age 24.11 years, SD = 10.35). Ethnicity and
gender were restricted to account for known differences in basal
testosterone levels. Participants played seventy rounds of a five
player sealed bid auction; task procedures were the same as above.
A cover story led the participants to believe they were playing
against other human opponents present at Stanford University,
while in reality the other players were simulated by the computer.
As part of the cover story, participants received multiple e-mail
reminders ahead of the experiment indicating that they should
be on time because they would participate in a multi-player
on-line auction. Three participants were excluded from data anal-
ysis because they did not believe the cover story. The study
was approved by the Stanford University Institutional Review
Board, and all participants gave written informed consent before
completing the task.
The expert auction
The expert auction uses the same common value auction and
experimental procedures as in Experiment 1. However, in this
version, participants were taught how to bid using the opti-
mal RNNE strategy prior to beginning the experiment (see
Equation 3). All participants completed a questionnaire before
the experiment to ensure comprehension of the task and the
RNNE strategy. Everyone completed this questionnaire without
error. In order to match the bidding strategies of the simulated
players, the computer bids were based on the behavior of expert
participants from a previously published study (van den Bos et al.,
2008, Experiment 2). Furthermore, in this version of the task the
number of auctions won by each player was displayed on the
screen.
Behavioral analyses
As in Experiment 1, we used the bid factor κ to measure over-
bidding. Recall that a bid factor of 1 implies that participants bid
their estimate (xi) of the true value (x0), whereas a bid factor of 0
indicates bidding RNNE. In this experiment, positive values for κ
occur when participants knowingly and willingly overbid since all
participants knew the optimal bidding strategy from the outset of
the task.
Testosterone
Testosterone is well-established to promote behaviors to seek or
protect social status in the face of competition (Mazur and Booth,
1998; Eisenegger et al., 2011). We collected two saliva samples in
order to measure individual differences in basal testosterone. The
first saliva samples were collected from participants immediately
upon arrival after obtaining written consent, and were imme-
diately frozen below −20◦C. The second saliva samples were
collected and at the end of the experiment. Participants were
informed that their saliva would be used to estimate testosterone
and cortisol levels. Saliva assays were obtained using Salimetrics
Oral Swabs, following standard protocol. All participants were
tested during the same time period, 4:00–4:45 and 5:15–6:00 pm,
to account for circadian changes in endocrine levels.
Serum testosterone and cortisol concentrations measured
before and after the test were positively correlated across all of the
subjects (r = 0.89, p < 0.001 and r = 0.85, p < 0.001, respec-
tively). To reduce noise inherent to the salivary assessments, we
therefore used the average concentration in the pre-test and the
post-test sample as our independent variable. Several studies
have shown that the relationship between testosterone and domi-
nance is moderated by the major human stress hormone cortisol
(Dabbs, 1990; Popma et al., 2007; Mehta and Josephs, 2010). We
therefore measured salivary concentrations of both testosterone
and cortisol. Linear regression analyses were performed with each
participant’s mean bid factor κ as the dependent variable and with
testosterone, cortisol, and testosterone × cortisol as independent
variables. All variables in the regression models were standard-
ized, and the interaction term was constructed from standard-
ized values. An additional simple slope analysis was performed
to investigate the direction and significance of the relationship
between testosterone and overbidding at different levels of cor-
tisol (Popma et al., 2007). Regression analysis for testosterone
and bid factor was then performed on a median split of cortisol
values.
Finally, we measured a proxy of prenatal testosterone, the ratio
in the lengths between the second and fourth fingers (2D:4D
ratio). This ratio has been shown in some studies to predict the
effects of testosterone on social behavior (Coates et al., 2009a;
Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Van Honk et al., 2011).
However, 2D:4D did not show any significant statistical effects in
our dataset and is therefore omitted from further discussion.
Questionnaires: social comparison, status, and risk
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to report their
affective responses to different social and monetary aspects of
auction outcomes. To further establish the relationship between
affective responses to social aspects of the auction task and
status seeking we used the Flynn questionnaire, which mea-
sures individuals’ need for social status (Flynn etal., 2006). As
expected, our analyses showed a strong correlation between
the (reverse scored) Flynn questionnaire and the affective
responses to social comparisons (r = 0.56, p < 0.006) but not
monetary outcomes (r = −0.16, p = 0.46). Again, the non-
weighted mean scores on the monetary and social items were
used as predictors for individual differences in competitive
behavior.
Finally, given that individual differences in financial risk atti-
tudes have been associated with both basal testosterone levels
(Apicella et al., 2008; Coates et al., 2009b) and overbidding (Holt
and Sherman, 2000), participants completed the DOSPERT30
(Blais and Weber, 2006) to assess and account for individual dif-
ferences in financial risk taking. Individual differences in risk
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preferences were added as a covariate to the regression model
testing for the relation between testosterone, cortisol and bidding
behavior.
RESULTS
Replicating earlier findings (van den Bos et al., 2008), we found
that even though participants were fully aware of the RNNE strat-
egy, they still overbid significantly [mean κ = 0.36, SD = 0.26,
t(22) = 6.45, p < 0.001], which resulted in an average loss of 9.78
MUs [t(22) = −2.30, p < 0.03] over the course of the experi-
ment. A robust linear regression model predicting overbidding
from basal testosterone and cortisol levels was significant [with
Huber weighting function (Venables and Ripley, 2002); r2 =
0.614, F(4, 18) = 5.68, p < 0.006]. See Table 1 for the full regres-
sion results and Table 2 for an overview of descriptive statistics
and correlations between variables. For overbidding, a signifi-
cant effect of testosterone [β = 0.47, t(18) = 2.16, p < 0.04] and
testosterone × cortisol [β = −0.80, t(18) = −3.19, p < 0.005]
was found, while the effects of cortisol [β = −0.34, t(18) = −1.78,
p = 0.09] and risk attitude [β = 0.16, t(18) = 0.80, p = 0.44]
were not significant. To further study the interaction, simple slope
analyses were performed on median split by cortisol level (see
Figure 3). A significant slope was found in the low cortisol group
[β = 0.65, t(11) = 2.61, p < 0.02], reflecting a significant positive
association between testosterone and overbidding at this level of
cortisol. No effect was found in the high cortisol group [β = 0.32,
t(10) = 1.52, p = 0.14]. In sum, we found that testosterone pre-
dicted overbidding, particularly for the group with low levels of
cortisol.
The analyses of the questionnaire indicated that participants
cared about both the social and the monetary outcomes of
the auctions [mean absolute rating of importance on 7-point
Likert scale = 4.9, σ = 0.7, t(22) = 29.87 against the null hypoth-
esis of “not-important” rating of 4, p < 0.001 and μ = 5.0,
σ = 0.7, t(22) = 66.61, p < 0.001 for social and monetary items,
Table 1 | Robust linear regression model predicting overbidding.
B* t p
Testosterone 0.47 2.15 0.04
Cortisol −0.34 −1.77 0.09
Testosterone × Cortisol −0.80 −3.18 0.005
Risk 0.15 0.79 0.44
*Standardized coefficients.
Table 2 | Correlations among variables.
I II III IV
I Bid Factor (k)
II Testosterone 0.48*
III Cortisol 0.08 0.32*
IV Risk 0.09 0.26 0.29
V Social comparison 0.56** 0.42* −0.21 −0.05
**p < 0.001, *p < 0.05.
respectively]. However, individual differences in mean levels of
overbidding during the experiment (mean κ) were correlated
with self-report measures of affective responses to social compar-
isons (r = 0.47, p < 0.02) but not monetary outcomes (r = 0.15,
p = 0.31, see Figure 4). Post-hoc comparison of z-transformed
correlation coefficients revealed that these correlations were sig-
nificantly different (z = 2.41, p < 0.01).
To further investigate the relationship between testosterone,
cortisol, affective responses and competitive bidding, we per-
formed a moderated mediation analysis. Specifically, we tested
whether the effect of testosterone on the bid factor was medi-
ated by the self-reported affective responses to social comparison.
Based on our simple slope analyses, we expected that the indirect
effect would be moderated by levels of cortisol. More specifi-
cally we tested whether the relationship between testosterone and
affective responses related to social comparisons was conditional
on levels of cortisol (see Figure 5).
In order to test the moderated mediation analyses hypoth-
esis we conducted the procedure proposed by (Preacher et al.,
2007), using the PROCESS algorithm provided by Hayes (Hayes,
2012). We calculated the 95% bias corrected bootstrap confidence
intervals (CIs) of the indirect effect on the basis of 5000 boot-
strap samples. When the CI ranges does not include zero this is
considered support for a significant mediation effect. We used
the mean as well as a standard deviation above and below the
FIGURE 3 | Interaction between testosterone and cortisol in relation to
overbidding. A significant positive relationship between testosterone and
overbidding was found at low cortisol but not low cortisol values. The x-axis
represents z-transformed testosterone levels.
FIGURE 4 | Individual differences in levels of overbidding were
correlated with self-report measures of affective responses to social
(r = 0.47, p < 0.02) but not monetary (r = 0.15, p = 0.31) outcomes.
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FIGURE 5 | Mediation of testosterone, affective responses to social
comparison and competitive overbidding. For illustration purposes we
have added the betas of the classical (Baron and Kenny, 1986) regression
method to test for mediation. The results, which are completely consistent
with the bootstrapping methods reported in the results section, show that
the relation between testosterone and competitive overbidding is mediated
by affective responses to social comparisons. For more detail on
moderation effects of cortisol see results.
mean cortisol levels to represent Moderate, High, and Low val-
ues for the moderation effect, respectively. The 95% CI around
the indirect effect ranged from 0.11 to 0.29 for the Low (−1 SD),
0.05 to 0.22 for the Moderate, and from −0.12 to 0.13 for the
High (+1 SD) cortisol group. These results show that the rela-
tionship between testosterone and overbidding was not mediated
by affective responses related to social comparisons for the High
cortisol group. However, the mediation was significant for the
Moderate and Low group, supporting the moderated mediation
analyses.
Consistent with previous studies, we found support for the
dual-hormone hypothesis (Mehta and Josephs, 2010) by showing
that the relation between testosterone and competitive behavior is
particularly strong when cortisol is low, and not significant when
cortisol levels are high. Furthermore, these results suggest that
the effect of testosterone on overbidding is mediated by affective
responses to social comparisons.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This paper shows that the extent to which participants overbid
in a competitive environment is related to two independent mea-
sures of drive for social status. First, overbidding was increased
by emphasizing a competitive aspect of the participants’ social
identity. Second, overbidding was predicted by basal levels of
testosterone, a hormone strongly associated with the drive for
status in humans and animals (Sapolsky, 2004). Thus, both a
person’s identity, of which the environment may cue particu-
lar aspects, and individual differences in biomarkers associated
with the drive for status predict costly competitive behavior. As
such, these results support the hypothesis that humans not only
compete in order to acquire goods but also to establish social
status. Furthermore, our results suggest that affective responses,
rather than cognitive skill, play an important role in competitive
behavior. Taken together, these results suggest that the utility of
status gains is partly determined by the biological make-up, and
partly by social identity, which in turn is thought to be deter-
mined by both the individual and environment factors (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2010).
It still remains to be determined precisely what the underly-
ing mechanisms are that may lead social identity or hormones
levels to result differences in overbidding. In line with mod-
els of anticipated affect (Mellers et al., 1997; Zeelenberg et al.,
2000). The correlation between our self-report measure of affect
and the ρwin and ρloss parameters of the reinforcement learn-
ing model suggest that the decisions might be determined by
both anticipated and experienced outcomes. In a recent study
we showed that competitive drive to win auctions is manifest in
fMRI BOLD responses in brain reward areas, including the ven-
tral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
both strongly associated with the computation of expected and
experienced reward value (van den Bos et al., 2013). In particu-
lar, responses in the VS and vmPFC reflected both trial-by-trial
variations in monetary as well as inferred social prediction errors
(see also Fliessbach et al., 2007). Furthermore, we have found that
the anterior insula (AI) and temporo-parietal cortex (TPJ) were
associated with individual differences in overbidding. Critically,
it was not just the level of activity in the AI and TPJ that pre-
dicted individual differences in overbidding, but also the degree
of functional connectivity between these regions and the VS and
vmPFC. Importantly, the level of connectivity was also correlated
with ρwin, ρloss, and the affective responses to social outcomes.
This suggests that one possible mechanism for the increased
competition induced by social identify may be the altered value
computation in the vmPFC by increased connectivity with the AI
and/or TPJ (Carter et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012).
Interestingly, several studies have shown that local activ-
ity and functional connectivity with the vmPFC are associated
with behavioral effects of testosterone (Mehta and Beer, 2010;
Bos et al., 2012). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that basal
testosterone levels are associated with increased functional con-
nectivity between vmPFC and AI/TPJ. Furthermore, we expect
that the testosterone related increased connectivity with the
vmPFC results in the increased utility attributed to status gains.
More specifically, in contrast with the effect of social iden-
tity on ρwin, we hypothesize that testosterone will lead to the
increased utility of winning (ρwin) and the disutility of not
winning (ρloss). This hypothesis is supported by more qualita-
tive work on testosterone, which suggests that people with high
basal testosterone levels experience both more pleasure when
they succeed or displeasure when they fail to achieve higher
status compared to low testosterone individuals (Josephs et al.,
2003; Newman et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 2008). Finally, one
suggested mechanism for the interaction between cortisol and
testosterone in the regulation of status seeking may be through
specific hormonal effects on connectivity between the limbic
regions and the vmPFC (Mehta and Josephs, 2010). Future stud-
ies that combine the current auction paradigm with measures
of hormones and neural activity across different social con-
texts may reveal the different mechanisms underlying competitive
behavior.
In some situations, such as the auction experiment we used,
the motivation for status may result in negative financial out-
comes. It seems that such deleterious competitive behavior
should not have evolved as a stable trait. However, follow-
ing Mayr’s famous distinction between proximate and ultimate
causes (Mayr, 1961), it seems likely that the ultimate cause for
these (proximal) behavioral mechanisms is that, over the course
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of evolution, the drive for status results in increased access to
resources and mates in the long run. In that sense the overbid-
ding can be seen as a case of costly signaling (Zahavi, 1975; Mazur
and Booth, 1998).
Finally, we point to an obvious limitation of our second study
is that it only considered male participants. Both testosterone
and competition (Gneezy et al., 2003) are known to have a
different effect on men and women. For instance, testosterone
increases reactive aggression in men but not women (Josephs
et al., 2011). Another important limitation is that we have corre-
lated behavior with basal levels of testosterone and thus cannot
make a strong claim about causality. Future studies, focusing
on female samples, or use the administration of testosterone,
may therefore reveal more details about the complex relations
between hormones and competitive behavior. Notwithstanding
these limitations, the current findings add to a growing literature
revealing the relationship between social and affective processes in
complex economic behavior, and specifically our understanding
of competitive behavior.
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APPENDIX
FACTOR ANALYSES OF SELF-REPORT MEASURES
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was
0.63, above the recommended value of 0.6, and Bartlett’s test
of sphericity was significant [χ2(36) = 121.26, p < 0.001], sug-
gesting a factor analysis is appropriate. Both non-grapical solu-
tions to the Cattel’s Scree Test, the optimal coordinate and
acceleration factor, proposed by Raîche et al. (2013) indicated
that 2 components should be retained in a factor analyses.
Finally we performed the maximum-likelihood factor analysis as
Table A1 | Self-report measures of affective responses to social and
monetary outcomes.
Question Social Monetary
1. Being the winner of an auction made me feel
(R)
0.54
2. Losing the auction made me feel 0.68
3. Losing money in the auction made me feel 0.99
4. Winning money made me feel (R) 0.63
5. Realizing that another player wins a lot of
auctions made me feel
0.97
6. Realizing that other players win more auctions
than I do made me feel
0.72
7. Not winning an auction over a long period of
time made me feel
0.62 0.56
8. The possibility that other players could make
more money than I do made me feel
0.38
9. The possibility that other players could make
less money than I do made me feel (R)
0.45
Variance explained 0.32 0.26
Cronbach Alpha 0.76 0.71
Table reports the eigenvalue of each item. Values < 0.3 are not reported. Items
marked with (R) were reverse scored.
implemented in R, using the promax (oblique) rotation for the
factor loading matrix.
All items reached the minimum criterion of having a pri-
mary factor loading of 0.3 or above (see Table A1). Item 7 is
considered a part of the social factor given that it has a higher
eigenvalue. Furthermore, note that items 8 and 9 have rather
low eigenvalues, this is most likely due to the fact that, in
this experiment, the participants are not able to directly com-
pare monetary outcomes with other players because since that
information was not available. The initial eigenvalues showed
that the first two factor explained 32 and 26% of the vari-
ance, respectively. Internal consistency for each of the scales
was examined using Cronbach’s alpha. The alphas were accept-
able (0.7 < α < 0.8): 0.76 for the first and 0.71 for the second
factor.
FIGURE A1 | Average bid factor of 35 participants that participated in a
pilot study with a 5-player auction with real players. For each computer
player a bid factor was picked from a Gaussian distribution of 0.2 around the
average bid factor.
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